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Administrative inspections are indispensable: without them there is
no practical way to determine whether there is compliance with the
plethora of health, sanitary, safety, and building regulations that ensure
that living and working conditions remain tolerable.' The need for
administrative agencies to have this power does not, however, immunize
inspections from the requirements of the fourth amendment.2 Ad-
ministrative inspections "are subject to the governing principle that a
search of private property, in the absence of consent, is 'unreasonable'
unless authorized by a valid search warrant."3 Nevertheless, when this
principle was announced in Camara v. Municipal Court4 and See v. City of
Seattle5 the Supreme Court reserved comment on inspections of businesses
in highly regulated industries:
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be
inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor do we question
such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require
inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product. Any
constitutional challenge to such programs can only be resolved . . . on a
case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.6
This language served as the basis for two Supreme Court decisions
that defined an exception to the Camara-See rule.7 In Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States8 and United States v. Biswell,9 the Court held that
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1. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 37, at 92 (1976).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
3. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 37, at 93.
4. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The basic purpose of the fourth amendments prohibition against
unreasonable searches "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials." Id. at 528.
5. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
6. Id. at 545-46.
7. Commentators have pointed out that the See decision apparentlyestablished three exceptions
to the warrant requirement: (1) "where there is consent"; (2) "where the workplace is open to the public
view"; and (3) "where there is an inspection conducted pursuant to a valid licensing program."
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?,
50 WASH. L. Rav. 341, 347 (1975).
8. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
9. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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the warrant requirement is not applicable to strictly regulated or licensed
businesses when Congress has determined that the search is necessary to
carry out a regulatory scheme and has given specific statutory authoriza-
tion for the search.'0 Subsequently, lower federal courts and state courts
expansively interpreted the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the Camara-
See rule in upholding a variety of warrantless administrative inspection
procedures." The policy behind Camara and See seemed to be in
jeopardy; 12 the Colonnade and Biswell decisions, along with the Supreme
Court's decision in Wyman v. James,13 indicated that the Court was
'returning to the approach it had followed in Frank v. Maryland,14 which
had upheld a warrantless administrative health inspection procedure. 5
This prognosis of the effects of Colonnade and Biswell was not,
however, borne out. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 6 and G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 7 for example, the Supreme Court
emphatically reemphasized its statement in Camara that "except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant."'18 Most recently, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,19 a
majority of the Justices held that administrative inspections of business
premises under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197020 violated
the fourth amendment unless such inspections were authorized by a
warrant or its equivalent.
10. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 38 at 98. In such businesses the legislature has broad
authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches, including authorizing warrantless
inspections by the relevant regulatory or licensing agency. Id. These two decisions had the effect of
holding businesses in certain heavily regulated industries to a type of constructive consent to
warrantless administrative searches as a prerequisite to doing busine:;s in that industry. See Note,
Warrantless Inspection in Enforcement of Federal Gun Control Act is Constitutional Under the
Fourth Amendment, 43 Miss. L. J. 562, 567 (1972).
11. See cases cited at note 75 infra. Since Camara and See, the Court has emphasized the
exceptions to the warrant requirement rather than its strictures. Rothstein & Rothshein, supra note 7,
at 341; notes 76-108 and accompanying text infra.
12 Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 366.
13. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See notes 60-73 and accompanying text infra.
14. 359 U.S: 360 (1959). See generally Note, Wyman v. James: Welfare lome Visits anda Strict
Construction of the Fourth Amendment, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 714 (1971).
15. The appellant in Frank was arrested and fined for refusing entry to a health inspector who
was acting on a neighbor's complaint of rat infestation in the neighborhood. The inspector found
evidence of such infestation near appellant's house. Appellant was convicted for resisting inspection
under a provision of the Baltimore City Code that entitled the health commissioner to demand entry to
any dwelling where he had cause to suspect a nuisance existed. The Court upheld the conviction and
concluded that no warrant was required for a health inspector to enter a private residence in order "to
determine whether conditions exist which the [city's] Health Code proseribes." 359 U.S. at 366. In its
opinion, the Court distinguished between civil and criminal investigations for fourth amendment
purposes and noted that the attempted inspection was merely to determine whether the proscribed
conditions existed, and if so, to give notice to the owner to remedy the infringing conditions. lI, This
distinction between civil and criminal investigations was repudiated in Camara and See.
16. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
17. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
18. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
19. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651- 678 (1976).
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Despite this strong reaffirmation of the necessity of a warrant for most
administrative inspections, the Colonnade and Biswell decisions have not
been overruled.2 1 There is no doubt that the essence of Camara and See-
that nonconsensual administrative inspections of commercial and
noncommercial premises require a warrant-is the rule and not the
exception,22 but it cannot be said that all warrantless administrative
inspection programs are now constitutionally infirm." Congress still has
power to enact laws authorizing warrantless searches in certain carefully
defined situations.24 The Supreme Court's recent decisions have clarified
the classes of cases that constitute the exceptions to the warrant
requirement for administrative inspections, but its reaffirmation of
Camara and See has not clearly defined the scope of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception.25
Congress will continue to extend federal regulation of various
industries and common commercial and industrial practices. Inspection
procedures are a critical part of many regulatory programs; the courts, as
the final arbiters of the reasonableness of administrative inspections, will
again be required to examine the constitutionality of warrantless
inspections. It is thus necessary to determine how the Supreme Court's
post-Biswell decisions, culminating in Barlow's, have affected the law of
administrative inspections and the fourth amendment. This article
discusses the continuing vitality of the Colonnade-Bisiwell exception to the
warrant requirement after Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., explains the
elements of the exception, and examines the classes of cases in which a
warrantless administrative search of private property is valid under the
fourth amendment.
I. THE Camara-See RULE AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS
A. Camara v. Municipal Court and See v. United States
Prior to 1967 the case law on administrative searches limited fourth
21. See notes 156-62 and accompanying text infra.
22. See Marshallv. Barlow's, Inc.,436 U.S. 307,313 (1978): "The clearimport ofourcases is that
the closely regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Bisiell is the exception. The
Secretary would make it the rule."
23. This concern was voiced by the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner in Barlosr's, who urged
"that requiring a warrant for OSHA inspectors will mean that, as a practical matter, warrantlesssearch
provisions in other regulatory statutes are also constitutionally infirm." Id. at 321. The Courts
response accepted the validity of his concern but implicitly indicated that some schemes might
withstand scrutiny: "The reasonableness of a warrantless search, however, will depend upon the
specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute." Id. In essence, the Court was
repeating Justice Whites statement in See that "[a]ny constitutional challenge to such programs can
only be resolved, as many have been in the past, on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness." 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1976).
24. Marshall v. Reinhold Constr., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 685. 693 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
25. The issue of the validity of warrantless inspection programs is still in a state of flux because it
is uncertain how the factors that determine the constitutionality of such inspections arc to be weighed.
See Weissberg, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Are Warrantless Routine OSHA Inspectionsa Violation of
the Fourth Amendment?, 6 ENVt'L Ai'. 423, 432-33 (1978).
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amendment protection to inspections associated with criminal
prosecutions. 26 Frank v. Maryland,27 decided in 1959, affirmed this
principle by holding that no warrant was required for a health inspector to
enter private dwellings suspected of statutory violations. The Supreme
Court's 1967 decisions in the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal
Court2' and See v. City of Seattle29 overruled Frank and held that "the
governmental intrusion accompanying an administrative search is within
the scope of the fourth amendment's protection and requires the
authorization of a search warrant. 30 Under Camara and See, however, a
magistrate may issue such a warrant on a showing that is less stringent than
probable cause in the criminal law sense 3 although the reasonableness of
the search "is still the ultimate standard. 32
In Camara the Court held that the fourth amendment barred
prosecution of an individual who refused to permit a warrantless
municipal housing inspection of his private residence. The Court said that
the fourth amendment's protection of the individual and his property was
not limited to instances in which he is suspected of criminal behavior.33
Rather, it concluded that "except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." 34 The traditional
showing of probable cause required for obtaining a warrant was relaxed,
however, for instances in which a legitimate public interest justified the
inspection.35
The decision in See v. City of Seattle extended the bar against
26. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616(1886); Murray's Lesseev. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272(1855). Only District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C,
Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), had held that a warrant was required for an
administrative entry. The doctrine was well established that the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment did not apply to administrative inspections. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 344,
27. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See note 15 supra.
28. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
29. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
30. Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. Rsv. 1011, 1012 (1973). See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
31. Id. at 534-39; see Greenburg, supra note 30, at 1012.
32. 387 U.S. at 539.
33. Id. at 530.
34. Id. at 528-29.
35. Instead of requiring a showing that a housing code violation would be found in a particular
dwelling before a warrant could issue, the Court in Camara authorized warrants on an area-wide basis.
This was considered a reasonable search of private property under the fourth amendment because
probable cause "standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based
upon the passage of time, the nature of the building. . . , or the condition of the entire area, but they
will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling." Id. at
538. If a valid public interest was demonstrated that justified the inspection, then there was probable
cause to issue a warrant. Id. at 539. In effect, the Court recognized that "[tio impose a blanket
requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of criminal evidence would hobble inspection
power." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 37, at 93-94 (footnote omitted). See also Comment, The Valldl/'
of Warrantless Searches Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,44 U. CINN. L. Ruv.
105, 106 (1975).
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warrantless administrative searches to commercial establishments. 6 In
See the Court stated that "[t]he businessman . ..has a constitutional
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon
his private commercial property." 7 It concluded that "administrative
entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which
are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or
physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure.' 38 The Court
also adhered to the flexible probable cause standard delineated in
Camara:39 "The agency's particular demand for access will of course be
measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible
standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for
effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved. ' 40
In Camara and See the Court faced the problem of extending
traditional fourth amendment protections to administrative inspection
situations. Instead of taking an all-or-nothing view of the fourth
amendment, the Court balanced the government's need for inspections
against the citizen's interest in privacy.4' The Court's relaxation of the
probable cause showing required before a warrant authorizing an
administrative inspection could issue is evidence of this balancing.42 These
decisions did not, however, bar all warrantless administrative inspections.
The Court noted that businesses were not shielded from warrantless
searches in emergency situations43 and that business premises might
"reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private
homes . . . . In addition, the Court reserved comment on the
constitutional validity of warrantless inspections of businesses engaged in
highly regulated industries:
[N]or do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing
programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or
marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge to such programs can only
be resolved, as many have been in the past, on a case-by-case basis under the
general Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.
45
This dictum proved significant because "of its potential for broad
exception to the Camara-See rule. ' 46
36. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In See, the owner of a commercial warehouse refused to admit a fire
inspector conducting a routine, periodic city-wide can ass to obtain compliance with the fire code.
37. Id. at 543.
38. Id. at 545.
39. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
40. 387 U.S. at 545.
41. See notes 163-65 and accompanying text infra.
42. Greenberg, supra note 30, at 1012-14.
43. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,539 (1967). See notes 166-74 and accompanying
text infra.
44. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
45. Id.
46. Greenberg, supra note 30, at 1016; see Comment, supra note 35, at 107;seealso Note, The
1979]
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B. The Colonnade-Biswell Exception
An exception to the Camara-See rule, based on the language quoted
above, quickly developed as warrantless inspections pursuant to licensing
programs were held permissible under the fourth amendment. In
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,47 a retail liquor dealer had
resisted a warrantless search of his locked storeroom by agents of the
Internal Revenue Service. The agents requested access to the store-
room; after the dealer refused to admit them they broke the lock and
entered. Their warrantless entry was allegedly authorized by sections
5146(b) and 7606 of the Internal Revenue Code. 8 The Court reversed the
dealer's conviction for the crime of refusing to admit a federal inspector on
the ground that the exclusive sanction for refusal to allow entry was a $500
fine,49 but the Code provisions authorizing warrantless inspections of
liquor dealers were not held unconstitutional. Rather, the Court accepted
the government's contention that the absence of a warrant was not fatal to
the legality of administrative searches specifically authorized by statute. In
this case the long history of the special treatment afforded inspection laws
dealing with the liquor industry provided the basis for the majority's
opinion that See's rule was not applicable. Since the liquor industry had
long been "subject to close supervision and inspection . . . Congress
ha[d] broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches
and seizures" in the liquor industry.50
Colonnade's exception to the warrant requirement for inspections of
licensed liquor dealers was expanded in United States v. Biswell5 t to
include warrantless inspections of licensed firearms dealers. In Biswell, a
United States Treasury agent inspected defendant's pawnshop pursuant to
Law of Administrative Inspections: Are Camara and See Still Alive and Well?, 1972 WASlh. U.L.Q.
313,327-28 (1972). Two district court decisions used this language to hold that inspections pursuant to
licensing programs controlling established liquor businesses were excluded from fourth amendment
protection. See United States v. Duffy, 282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Sessions,
283 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
47. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
48. I.R.C. § 5146(b) provides:
The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of storage)
of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or other documents
required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter or regulations issued pursuant thereto
and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises.
I.R.C. § 7606 provides:
(a) Entry during day.
The Secretary may enter, in the daytime, any building or place where any articles or
objects subject to tax are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary for the
purpose of examining said articles or objects.
(b) Entry at night.
When such premises are open at night, the Secretary may enterthem while so open, in the
performance of his official duties.
49. 397 U.S. at 77. Section 7342 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a fine of $500 for every
refusal to admit an agent acting under the authority of § 7606. I.R.C. § 7342. Although the
use of force in carrying out the search was improper, Congress had authority to provide for such action.
50. 397 U.S. at 77.
51. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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an inspection procedure authorized by the Gun Control Act of 1968.52 The
agent presented proper identification, looked over defendant's books, and
asked for permission to inspect a locked storeroom. The defendant asked
for a search warrant, and the agent responded by showing him the
provisions of the statute that authorized inspection. The dealer read the
statute and then unlocked the storeroom where the agent found evidence
that led to defendant's conviction for the unlicensed possession of two
sawed-off rifles.53 The court of appeals overturned this conviction, holding
that the Act was unconstitutional and that the evidence seized had to be
suppressed,54 but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
conviction.
The Court held that the entry in Biswell was valid because it was not
forcible and was made under lawful authority. The statutory scheme was
upheld on the basis that unannounced inspections were essential if
inspections were to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent to
violation of the laws relating to the control of firearms." The defendant's
challenge that he had involuntarily consented to the search was rejected as
inapposite. The Court drew an analogy between one who voluntarily
submits to a lawful, statutorily authorized regulatory inspection and one
who acquiesces in a search of his dwelling authorized by a valid warrant. In
both cases, said the Court, the person accepts the mandate of legal process
rather than face criminal sanctions. The legality of a search that is carefully
regulated by statute, therefore, depends upon the authority of valid
legislation and not on consent. 6 The Court further reasoned that when a
businessman chooses to deal in a heavily regulated industry and accept a
federal license, he is held informed of the necessity, expectability, and
limits of governmental inspections. Under such regulatory statutes, the
dealer's right to privacy is not unjustifiably interfered with by inspections
performed without a warrant.
57
The Court's analysis in Biswell was not, however, limited to
52. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976). The inspection provision authorized official entry during business
hours into "the premises . . . of any firearms or ammunition . . . dealer .. . for the purpose of
inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept . . . and (2) any firearms or
ammunition kept or stored by such .. dealer .. . at such premises."
53. 406 U.S. at 312-13.
54. 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971).
55. 406 U.S. at 314-16. See was distinguished on the ground that the conditions that were the
subject of inspection in See could not be easily concealed orcorrected in a short period of time and that
any delay for obtaining a warrant would not lessen the effectiveness of the regulatory program. Id. at
316. In the circumstances presented by Biswell, however, a warrant requirement would frustrate
regulation of firearms because of the portability of the goods. Id.
56. Id. at 315. The householder acquiesces to a search pursuant to a warrant because the
alternative is a possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry. The firearms dealer
acquiesces because Congress has made it a crime to violate any provisions of the Gun Control Act. See
id. at 315 & n.4.
57. Id. at 316. The Court also noted that requiring a warrant under conditions that preserved
needed flexibility would not give to the citizen greater protection from unreasonable searches than the
statute already provided. Id.
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businesses with long histories of governmental regulation.8 Instead, the
Court announced an exception to the Camara-See rule that included all
regulatory searches that furthered urgent federal interests: "We have little
difficulty in concluding that where, as here, regulatory inspections further
urgent federal interests, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to
privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed
without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute."
59
C. Welfare Visits
A third case that limited the scope of the Camara-See warrant
requirement for administrative inspections was Wyman v. James.
60
Wyman dealt with the extent to which welfare recipients are protected by
the fourth amendment against home visits of welfare workers. The
decision arose out of an action challenging the constitutionality of a New
York statute requiring the termination of welfare payments if the
beneficiary refused to allow the warrantless home visits.6' Plaintiff claimed
she had a right to refuse a home visit without losing her assistance on the
ground that the home visit was a search, and that when this search was
neither consented to nor supported by a warrant, it violated her fourth
amendment rights.62
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's claim on alternate holdings: 3
first, that there was no search within the meaning of the fourth amendment
because her refusal to allow the visit did not result in a forced entry, did not
give rise to a criminal penalty, and was more rehabilitative than
investigative;64 and, second, that even if this visit was a search, it did
not descend to the level of unreasonableness, even though it was not
accompanied by a warrant or by any determination of probability. 65 In
support of its second holding the Court listed several factors that made the
warrantless visitation procedure reasonable. In particular, the Court
emphasized the public's interest in the correct use of welfare funds and the
benign purpose of the visit.
66
58. "Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not a; deeply rooted in history as is
governmental control of the liquor industry, but close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of central
importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime .... . Id. at 315.
59. Id. at 317. See Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN, L. REv. 607, 618 (1974).
60. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
61. Id. at 311-12 & nn.2-4.
62. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 39, at 100.
63. Thus, the opinion, which reversed the decision of a three-judge district court, James v.
Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), is not clear with regard to the fourth amendment theory
relied on in resolving the issue. Greenberg, supra note 30, at 1028.
64. 400 U.S. at 316-18.
65. Id. at 318.
66. Id. at 318-25. The following circumstances supported the reas;onableness of the search: (1)
motivation in benevolent interest in the child; (2) fulfillment of a public trust in ensuring that funds are
properly spent; (3) the unobtrusive, friendly nature of the search; (4) the lack of other methods for
acquiring the needed information; and (5) the lack of any purpose to conduct the visit in aid of a
[Vol. 40:81
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The Wyman decision was heavily criticized 67 even though the Court
suggested that unreasonable inspection procedures would be held uncon-
stitutional.6 8 The Court was not dealing with specialized and highly
regulated businesses, as it had in Colonnade and Biswell, but rather with
the broad field of public welfare. The Court's opinion seemed to provide
the basis for another exception to the Camara-See rule69 by focusing on the
nature of the penalty (forfeiture of benefits) rather than on the type of
premises being searched.70 Taken together, therefore, the Colonnade,
Biswell, and Wyman decisions reflected a trend that seemed to negate, or at
least threaten, the Camara-See rule that nonconsensual administrative
inspections of commercial and noncommercial premises require war-
rants.71 It seemed as if there had been a partial reaffirmation of the doc-
trine of Frank v. Maryland,72 and that Camara and See had been the
high water marks in the Supreme Court's application of the fourth
amendment to protect privacy interests in the administrative context.73
D. Developments After Biswell and Colonnade
The Supreme Court's holdings in Colonnade and Biswell, if narrowly
criminal proceeding. The Court observed that a warrant could be harmful in inducing a hostile arm's
length element when an atmosphere of trust should be fostered. In addition, ifa wvarrant were obtained
it would give more authority than is needed or desired. Also, a warrant wouldjustify entry by forceand
permit a greater scope of inspection than simply allowing the caseworker to see the child in the home
and assure that the child is receiving the benefit of the aid. Id.
67. See, e.g., Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v.
James, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1259 (1971); Greenberg, supra note 30, at 1027-35; Note, The Implicatlons of
Wyman v. James: The Burger Court, The Fourth Amendment and the Privacy ofthe Home, 48 DEN.
L.J. 87 (1971). Note, AFDC Caseworker's Visit to Home of Nonconsenting Velfare Recipient Not
Prohibited by Fourth Amendment, 24 VAND. L. REV. 821 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Caseworker's Visit]; Note, supra note 46, at 338-45.
68. 400 U.S. at 326.
69. One commentator has noted that the decision provided two ways to get around Camara and
See. First, one could determine that the warrantless "intrusion upon privacy is not a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment because it is 'benevolent' rather than investigative, notwithstanding
the fact that evidence of crime can be uncovered." Note, supra note 14, at 734 (1971). Second, the
opinion's discussion of reasonableness arguably provided the basis fora new exception to the warrant
requirement: "In a non-criminal context the interest of privacy may be outweighed by a reasonable
governmental interest," and the test of reasonableness would focus not on the"relativ ease with which
a warrant could be obtained" but on "the reasonableness with which the search is conducted and the
reasonableness of the factors which motivated the search." Id.
70. Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Warrantless Occupational Safety and
Health Act Inspections, 82 DICK. L. REv. 773, 780 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Fourth
Amendment Implications]. "In distinguishing Camara, the Court created an exception that applies
when the only possible sanction for refusing to permit inspection is a loss ofa government benefit rather
than the criminal sanctions that ensued in the Camara case." Id. See also Comment, The
Constitutionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 22 VILL. L. REv. 1214, 1219 (1976-77).
71. Rothstein& Rothstein, supra note 7, at 382; Note, Inspections ByAdministrativeAgen des:
Clarification of the Warrant Requirement, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 879, 890 (1974).
72. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). The emphasis in IWyman on the beneficial purpose of the visit indicated
reaffirmation of Frank v. Maryland, which had posited the idea that there is a constitutional distinction
between civil and criminal investigations. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,323 (1971); Note, supra
note 14, at 734.
73. See Note, Caseworker's Visit, supra note 67, at 827; Note, Administrative Investigations of
Welfare Recipients, 22 CAsE W. Res. L. REv. 581, 588 (1971).
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limited to firearms and liquor inspections, were not out of line with earlier
state and federal decisions. 74 Several post-Biswell cases, 75 however,
showed that the Supreme Court's lack of precision in delineating the extent
of the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the Camara-See rule led to its
expansion in the lower courts to include unlicensed but regulated
industries.76 Such expansion was nevertheless consistent with the Biswell
majority's reasoning "that the exception to the Camara-See rule included
all regulatory searches that furthered urgent federal interests."" Whether
urgent federal interests were present was determined on a case-by-case
basis "by a showing that unique circumstances, such as concealability or
portability of the object of the inspection, would frustrate the regulatory
scheme if the guidelines for inspections outlined in Camara and See had to
be followed. 78
In United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye,79 the Second Circuit
followed Biswell and upheld a warrantless search of a pharmacy under a
procedure authorized by the New York Public Health Law.80 The court
emphasized that this inspection was limited by statute to the business
records and goods of an industry that was properly subject to intensive
regulation in the public interest.8' A warrant was unnecessary because it
would merely "track the statute" and give the person objecting to the
search no more protection than he already had. 2
The Terraciano holding did not expand the exception to the Camara-
See rule announced in Biswell. Although the court did not expressly state
that requiring a warrant would frustrate the regulatory scheme, it did
74. State and federal cases decided prior to Biswell and Colonnade had upheld the validity of
warrantless licensing inspections for a variety of commercial enterprise;, ranging from funeral homes
to convalescent homes. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 362-63 & nn, 116-26. A number of the
pre-Biswell cases were decided on the theory of implied consent. Id. at 362 n. 115.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (warrantless safety
inspection as a condition of airplane boarding); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972)
(warrantless search of luggage in furtherance of an agriculture quarantine); United States v. One (1) 43
Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (warrantless safety inspection of a licensed boat
by United States Coast Guard); State v. Dailey, 209 Kan. 707, 498 P.2d 614 (1972) (warrantless
inspection of liquor dealer); State v. Wybierala, 305 Minn. 455, 235 N.W.2d 197 (1975) (warrantless
inspection ofjunkyard); Uzzillia v. Commissioner of Health, 47 App. Div. 2d 492, 367 N.Y.S.2d 795
(1975) (warrantless safety inspection of licensed nursing home); People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 76 Misc,
2d 222, 350 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1973) (warrantless inspection of pharmacy); State v. Felger, 19 Or. App. 39,
526 P.2d 611 (1974) (warrantless safety inspection immediately after fire).
76. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 363-66, See Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v.
Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973); United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa,
1972), aff'dmem., 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973). Contra, United States v. Hart, 359 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del,
1973).
77. Comment, supra note 35, at 108.
78. Id.
79. 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
80. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3385 (McKinney 1977). The inspection in question was of the
pharmacist's records concerning narcotics and other controlled substances.
81. 493 F.2d at 685. The search was not unreasonable because the statute limited its scope and
notified the owner of its lawful restrictions.
82. Id. The statute served the purposes of a warrant by preventing a general search. Id. at 685,
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recognize an urgent federal interest in controlling narcotics.8 3 The deci-
sion, however, contained dictum indicating that the court believed that
the Camara-See rule had been negated. 4 It said that those holdings "were
rather promptly narrowed, as, indeed, had been foreshadowed by Camara
and See themselves," in Colonnade and Biswell.s5
Federal courts also upheld warrantless administrative inspections
under provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 6 In
United States v. Business Builders, Inc.,s7 the court noted that the Act's
inspection provision permitted inspection at reasonable times of
warehouses containing food, drugs, or cosmetics, and that the statute in
effect took the place of a valid search warrant.8 8 Upholding the statutory
inspection procedure was consistent with the Colonnade-Biswell excep-
tion. As the court pointed out: "It would be an affront to common sense to
say that the public interest is not as deeply involved in the regulation of the
food industry as it is in the liquor and firearms industries." 89 Similarly, in
United States v. Del Campo Baking Manufacturing Co.,9° the Delaware
district court held that the inspection of Del Campo's facilities was entirely
proper under Biswell despite the defendant's contention that Biswell was
inapplicable because the baking company was not federally licensed.9' The
Biswell decision was not to be so narrowly construed because
[t]he fact that Biswell was federally licensed ...was not the rationale for
upholding the warrantless inspection under the Fourth Amendment. The
thrust of [Biswell] is that there is no issue of consent to a regulatory inspection
conducted without a warrant when such a compliance inspection is
authorized by federal statute in a "pervasively regulated business."92
Even though Del Campo was not required to obtain a federal license to
operate, the court considered the business as "pervasively regulated" by the
83. See Comment, supra note 35, at 109.
84. See Note, Warrantless Nonconsensual Searches Under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 46 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 93, 98 (1977).
85. 493 F.2d at 684.
86. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).The inspection provision, 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (1976), provides in
part:
For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or employees duly designated by
the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials and a written notice to the
owner . . . are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times, any factory, warehouse, or
establishment in which foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics are manufactured, processed,
packed, or held, for introduction into interstate commerce or after such introduc-
tion ...and (2) to inspect, at reasonable times and within reasonable limits and in a
reasonable manner, such factory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle and all pertinent
equipment, finished and unfinished materials; containers, and labeling therein . . . .Each
such inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasonable promptness.
87. 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
88. Id. at 143.
89. Id.
90. 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972).
91. Id. at 1377.
92. Id. at 1376.
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as if it were federally licensed.9"
The Biswell exception to the warrant requirement was construed in
Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton94 to include the unlicensed but
heavily regulated coal industry. 95 In Youghiogheny the court upheld the
constitutionality of provisions in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 196996 that directed and required the Secretary of the Interior and
his authorized representatives to make warrantless searches of coal
mines. 97 The court noted that the coal industry had long been held subject
to Congress' powers under the commerce clause and that businesses in this
pervasively regulated industry appeared to have consented, "by implica-
tion at least, to reasonable intrusions by federal authorities.""5 Whether
the inspection scheme was constitutional depended upon "whether
warrantless searches, in the context of mine safety investigations, are
reasonable." 99 Reasonableness was determined by (1) "whether the
government had a valid and important interest in this area," (2) whether
resort to a magistrate for a warrant would frustrate attainment of the
statute's goals, (3) whether the coal mine owner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and (4) whether a grave danger of abuse was
created by allowing warrantless entry.100 The court found the investigative
scheme reasonable under these criteria and accordingly held permissible
the legislative determination
that probable cause or exigent circumstances exist in the coal industry so as to
make warrantless searching of its mines reasonable . . . . In the Fourth
Amendment area, where the essence of the right hinges on a concept of
reasonableness, the Congressional definition is entitled to great weight. In the
case at bar . . . we refuse to second guess its determination.' 0'
After the Youghiogheny decision, legislative determinations of
reasonableness within the meaning of the fourth amendment were given
even greater weight when a federal district court in Georgia upheld the
93. Id. at 1377.
94. 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
95. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 364-65.
96. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976).
97. Id. §§ 813, 814, 819. Section 813(a), for example, provides:
Authorized representatives of the Secretary shall make frequent inspections and
investigations in coal mines each year for the purpose of (1) obtaining, utilizing, and
disseminating information relating to health and safety conditions, the causes of accidents
and the causes of diseases and physical impairments originating in such mines, (2) gathering
information with respect to mandatory health or safety standards, (3) determining whether
an imminent danger exists, and (4) determining whether or not there is compliance with the
mandatory health or safety standards or with any notice, order, or decision issued under this
subchapter. In carrying out the requirements of clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection, no
advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person. In carrying out the
requirements of clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection in each underground coal mine, such
representatives shall make inspections of the entire mine at least four times a year.
98. 364 F. Supp. at 49-50.
99. Id. at 50.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 52.
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constitutionality of warrantless inspections by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) pursuant to provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.102 In Brennan v. Buckeye
Industries, Inc., 0 3 the Secretary of Labor was granted an order compelling
an inspection after Buckeye refused to permit a warrantless inspection of
its business premises even though there had been neither citations for
alleged violations nor any complaints by employees of Buckeye to
OSHA. 104 The court reasoned that the regulatory powers of the federal
government and the compelling need for unannounced inspections made
the entry reasonable,0 5 and that requiring a probable cause showing
"would serve to destroy the object of the legislation."'0 6 The decision thus
sanctioned warrantless safety and health inspections for the nation's
estimated five million business establishments and sixty million employees
covered by OSHA without a compelling reason and without regard to
whether the businesses were regulated or licensed.10 7 With Buckeye
Industries, the Biswell exception for licensing a business or marketing a
product became so far reaching that it threatened to nullify the Camara-
See rule.'0 8
II. THE RENAISSANCE OF Camara AND See
Despite the emphasis placed on the Biswell exception to the warrant
requirement and its expansion by several lower court decisions, the
Supreme Court has emphatically reaffirmed its holding in Camara that
"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant."' 0 9 It is now very clear that Camara
and See state the rule with regard to administrative searches and
inspections. t 0
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,"' border patrol agents
searching for illegal aliens on a roving patrol twenty-five miles north of the
Mexican border stopped a car and conducted a warrantless search
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
103. 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
104. Id. at 1351.
105. Id. at 1354.
106. Id.
107. See also BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, TIlE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTit AcT OF 1970, at 1
(1971) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU]; Robbins, Truth and Rumor About OSHA, 33 FED. BJ. 149
(1974).
108. See Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 366. The Buckeye case was heaily criticized
almost immediately after it was decided. See Comment, OSIJA v. The Fourth Amendment:
Should Search Warrants Be Required for "Spot Check" Inspections?, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 282 (1977);
Note, Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc.: The Constitutionality of an OSHA IWarrantless Search,
1975 DUKE L.J. 406; Comment, supra note 35; Note, supra note 84.
109. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
110. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
111. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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allegedly authorized by section 1357 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act." 2 The search of the automobile uncovered marijuana, and the
petitioner was subsequently convicted for having knowingly received and
facilitated the transportation of illegally imported marijuana in violation
of federal law. The Supreme Court held that the search, made without
probable cause or consent, violated the fourth amendment and reversed
the conviction.
In Almeida-Sanchez the government argued that the cases dealing
with administrative inspections supported the validity of the search.'13 The
Court rejected this contention, however, because the search in question
"embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that
the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a
warrant prior to the inspection."'"1 4 The Court also stated that Biswell and
Colonnade were inapposite:
A central difference between those cases and this one is that businessmen
engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the
burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here was
not engaged in any regulated or licensed business. The businessman in a
regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.115
The Court's analysis indicated that the Biswell-Colonnade holdings were
limited in scope" 6 and that the Camara-See rule, which requires that a
search be carried out pursuant to either a warrant, a finding of probable
cause, or consent," 7 would continue to have vitality.
In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,"8 the Court again reaffirmed
the Camara-See principle. In this case the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
had investigated the tax liability of an individual taxpayer who was a
fugitive from justice, determined deficiencies for two years, and made
jeopardy assessments pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code."19 The IRS
determined that the petitioner was the taxpayer's alter ego and then made a
warrantless, forced entry of petitioner's office for the purpose of levying
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1976). Section 1357(a)(3) gives to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service power without a warrant to search any vehicle within a reasonable distance of the border. A
reasonable distance is construed by the Attorney General's regulation to mean within one hundred
miles of the border. 8 C.F.R. § 287.l(a)(2) (1978).
113. 413 U.S. at 269. Since there was no probable cause for the scaich, "[n]o claim was made, nor
could one be, that the search of the ... car was constitutional under [Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925)]."
114. Id. at 270.
115. Id. at 27 1. The Court also emphasized that in Biswelland Colonnade the inspecting officers
knew that the premises searched were used for the sale of liquor or guns, while in the border search in
controversy "there was no reason whatever to believe that [defendantI or his automobile had even
crossed the border, much less that he was guilty of the commission of an offense." Id. at 271-72,
116. The Court's statement, however, seems to acknowledge that the Bis'eII-Colonnade
exception includes unlicensed but pervasively regulated industries.
117. Id. at 270.
118. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
119. I.R.C. § 6861(a).
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property subject to seizure. No initial seizures were made, but two days
later the IRS agents again entered the office without a warrant and seized
books, records, and other property. The Supreme Court held that this
warrantless entry violated the fourth amendment.120 Its analysis of the
warrant requirement began with Camara: "one governing prin-
ciple ... has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper
consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant.
121
The Court acknowledged that "a business, by its special nature and
voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would not be
permissible in a purely private context."' 22 In this case, however, the
intrusion was not based on the nature of petitioner's business, its license or
any specific regulation of its activities. 23 Rather, the search was based
merely on the fact that petitioner's assets were seizable to satisfy tax
assessments. Thus, there was no reason to treat petitioner differently
simply because it was a corporation, and fourth amendment protections
were available to it.'
24
It stretched the Biswell exception too far to say that the federal
interest in tax collection was sufficient to justify warrantless intrusions into
our private and business lives. Individuals and businesses, simply because
they are taxpayers, should not be subject to intrusions of this nature.
Otherwise, the fourth amendment would become meaningless. Nor, with a
federal interest as generalized in its application as taxation and the
collection of taxes, can it be said that taxpayers impliedly consent to
warrantless IRS inspections. Expectations of privacy are not so low. In the
taxation context the federal interest in collection is outweighed by the
taxpayer's privacy interest, which can only be protected by the warrant
requirement. Thus, the Court was correct in its unwillingness to say that
section 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code exempted from the warrant
requirement "every intrusion into privacy made in furtherance of any tax
125 1 26
seizure."' 25 This type of search had to be authorized by a valid warrant.
120. 429 U.S. at 359. In G.M. Leasing the Supreme Court considered the history ofenforcement
of the tax laws, the scope of the Internal Revenue Code provisions authorizing "distraint and seizure by
any means," I.R.C. §§ 6331, 7701(a)(21), the burden on the government of having to obtain a warrant,
and the urgent federal interest in the collection of taxes. 429 U.S. at 356-57. The government argued
that this urgent interest brought the case within the Colonnade-Biswell rationale, but the Court
distinguished those cases as presenting "voluntary participation in a highly regulated activity," whereas
the Code section in question "covers all defaults on all taxes." The Court was"u nwilling to hold that the
mere interest in the collection of taxes is sufficient to justify a statute declaringperse exempt from the
warrant requirement every intrusion into privacy made in furtherance of any tax seizure." Id. at 357-58.
121. Id. at 352-53 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
122. Id. at 353.
123. Id. at 354.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
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III. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
A. The Holding
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act)127 was enacted
"to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions.' 28 Characterized as the "most all
encompassing piece of legislation since the income tax,"'129 the Act covers
over five million employers and nearly sixty million employees. 3 0 The key
to its enforcement is the authority vested in the Secretary of Labor to make
periodic inspections of business premises' and to issue citations for any
violations discovered during the investigation.132 It authorizes inspections
to take place without consent of the owner and without a search warrant.'13
With over 2200 agency employees conducting thousands of inspections
each year, the Act affects almost every business in, the country.134
The Act's inspection provisions have been the topic of scholarly
comment and criticism, 35 and several companies have challenged this
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
128. Id. § 651.
129. The Effects of the Administration of the Occupational Safety and Health Act on Small
Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business of the
Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) (statement of Rep. William
L. Hungate).
130. Robbins, supra note 107, at 149.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). This subsection provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an
employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hour, and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of
employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices,
equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner,
operator, agent, or employee.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1976).
133. There was a controversy over whether Congress intended to permit warrantless OSHA
inspections. Aside from the statute's silence on the need to obtain a %arrant prior to inspection, the
only suggestion that the statute contemplates warrantless searches is a passing remark to that effect in
the minority views on a rejected version of the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1291,91st Cong., 2d Sess, 55
(1970). Section 8(a) of the Act directs inspectors to enter "without delay" upon presentation of
credentials. This language does not necessarily mean that an inspector may enter business premises
without a warrant, but a warrant requirement would be inconsistent with immediate entry, On the
other hand, during debate in the House of Representatives one of the Act's sponsors stated that
inspectors would have to follow applicable constitutional guidelines. 116 CoNo. REc. 38,709 (1970)
(remarks of Rep. Steiger). See Note, supra note 84, at 102-04; Comment, supra note 70, at 1222-23. Tile
existence of this controversy was also shown by the several results reached by district courts
considering the Act's inspection provisions. See notes 135-39 and accompanying text inifra,
134. Corn, A New Posturefor the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 27 LAD. L..
259 (1976). An "employer" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976) as any person engaged in a business
affecting commerce who employs one or more workers. Administrative directives now exempt
employers of fewer than ten employees from certain of the Act's requirements. [1977] O.S. H. RtEP.
(BNA) 235.
135. See, e.g., Weissberg, supra note 25; Note, supra note 84; Comment, supra note 71.
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authority in the courts. 36 Three different conclusions were reached in the
lower courts: (1) without deciding whether or not the Act's inspection
provisions were constitutional several courts held that Congress intended
that OSHA function within a constitutionally acceptable warrant
procedure; 37 (2) two courts held that warrantless, nonconsensual OSHA
inspections were reasonable and not proscribed by the fourth
amendment; 38 and (3) one court held that warrantless inspections were
authorized by the Act but were unconstitutional.139 This controversy was
ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 40 which held that warrantless inspections pursuant to
section 8(a) of the Act' 4' violated the fourth amendment.
The Barlow's case dealt with the refusal of Bill Barlow, a plumbing
contractor, to admit an OSHA inspector to the nonpublic employee areas
of his business. The inspector entered the company's customer-service
area, presented credentials, and informed Mr. Barlow that he wished to
inspect the company's working areas. Mr. Barlow asked the inspector if he
had a search warrant, the answer was no, and admission was refused.
Subsequently, a district court issued an order compelling Mr. Barlow to
admit the inspector, but he again refused and sought injunctive relief
against the warrantless inspection. 42 A three-judge court was convened; it
concluded that under Camara and See the fourth amendment required a
warrant for the search and that section 8(a) was unconstitutional. 43
The Supreme Court affirmed. 44 The Court noted that it had already
held warrantless searches to be generally unreasonable for commercial
premises as well as homes "except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases." 45 Therefore, "unless some recognized exception to the warrant
requirement applies" the See decision requires a warrant to conduct
136. Marshall v. Reinhold Constr., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 685 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Usery v. Centrif-Air
Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Marshallv. Shellcast Corp.,5O.S.H.C. 1689 (N.D. Ala.
1977); Alaska Truss & Millwork v. Alaska, 5 O.S.H.C. 1530 (Alaska 1977); Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery,424
F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976) (three-judge court), aft'dsun nor. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627 (D. N.M. 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's
Prods., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976); In re Rupp Forge Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1487 (N.D. Ohio
1976); Dunlop v. Able Contractors Inc.,4 O.S.H.C. 1110 (D. Mont. 1975); Brennan v. Buckeye Indus.,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
137. See, e.g., Usery v. Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Dunlop v.
Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627 (D. N.M. 1976); Brennan v.Gibson's Prods., Inc.,407 F. Supp.
154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
138. Dunlop v. Able Contractors Inc., 4 O.S.H.C. 1110 (D. Mont. 1975) (citing Brennan v.
Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974)).
139. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976)(three-judge court),afdsubnom.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
140. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
141. The text of this section is set forth at note 131 supra.
142. 436 U.S. at 310.
143. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976)(three-judge court),aff dsub nom.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
144. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
145. Id. at 312 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
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OSHA inspections. 146 The Court acknowledged that Biswell and
Colonnade are exceptions to the Camara-See rule, but said that they were
responses to virtually unique circumstances concerning industries with
such a history of governmental oversight that no reasonable expectation of
privacy could exist for the proprietors. 147 When one engaged in such a
business he voluntarily chose "to subject himself to a full arsenal of
governmental regulation."1 48 To the Court the clear import of its decisions
was that these closely regulated industries are the exception and not the
rule. 141
The government had argued that the Act's inspection provision
should be upheld because all businesses that were engaged in interstate
commerce had long been subjected to close supervision of employee safety
and health conditions and therefore fit within the Colonnade-Biswell
exception. In response the Court stated:
But the degree of federal involvement in employee working circumstances has
never been of the order of specificity and pervasiveness that OSHA mandates.
It is quite unconvincing to argue that the imposition of minimum wages and
maximum hours on employers who contracted with the government under
the Walsh-Healy Act prepared the entirety of American interstate commerce
for regulation of working conditions to the minutest detail. Nor can any but
the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to later searches be found in the
single fact that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce; under
current practice and law, few businesses can be conducted without having
some effect on interstate commerce. 50
Thus businessmen had not, by utilizing employees in their enterprises,
thrown open their private working areas to the warrantless scrutiny of
government agents,151 and the fact that employees were free to report
violations of the Act was no justification for agents to enter restricted areas
to conduct warrantless inspections.1 52
The Court was not convinced that requiring warrants would impose
serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts. Nor did the
majority believe that requiring warrants would prevent inspections
necessary to enforce the statute or make inspections less effective.' 1
3
Furthermore, the Court did not agree that the incremental privacy
protections afforded by a warrant were so marginal that they did not justify
the administrative burdens obtaining a warrant might entail. 154 It
146. 436 U.S. at 313.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 314.
151. Id. at 315.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 322. "A warrant ...would provide assurances from a neutral officer that tile
inspection is reasonable . . . .is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrativc plan
containing specific neutral criteria." Id. at 323. A warrant would also "advise the owner of the scope
and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not c):pcctcd to proceed," M1.
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concluded that the government's numerous concerns did not suffice to
justify warrantless OSHA inspections or "vitiate the general constitutional
requirement that for a search to be reasonable a warrant must be
obtained."''i 5
B. The Effect on the Colonnade-Biswell Exception
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. signaled that the fourth amendment is not
in general retreat before an administrative advance.'5 Nevertheless, it
cannot be said that all statutorily authorized warrantless administrative
inspection schemes are now invalid.
In Barlow's the Secretary of Labor argued that requiring a warrant for
OSHA inspections would mean that warrantless search schemes in other
regulatory statutes are also constitutionally infirm.157 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument indirectly. It said that its opinion was based "on the
facts and law concerned with OSHA," and that it would "not retreat from a
holding appropriate to that statute because of its real or imagined effect on
other, different administrative schemes." t58 It indicated that future
determinations would be made on a case-by-case basis: "The
reasonableness of a warrantless search, however, will depend upon the
specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute.' 59
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. left intact the Colonnade-Biswell exception
to the warrant requirement for closely regulated industries; however, such
industries were found to be the exception and not the rule.160 Furthermore,
despite emphatic reaffirmation of the policy behind Camara and See, the
Court indicated that other inspection programs may be constitutional
when "regulations [are] already so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell
exception to the warrant requirement could apply."''
The questions that remain after Barlow's are (1) what is the scope of
this exception and (2) how does one determine whether a particular
statutory inspection scheme is reasonable and thus within this valid
exception to the warrant requirement. The answers are necessarily to be
found by scrutinizing fourth amendment interpretations and examining
the diverse circumstances under which warrantless searches have been held
reasonable. Reasonableness is the ultimate standard, and the
reasonableness of a search depends on the legitimacy of the privacy
interests at stake. 62 These issues will be examined in the context of
155. Id. at 324.
156. Two district courts reached the same conclusion prior to Barlows. See Usery v. Centrir-Air
Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959,961 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Brennan v. Gibson's Prods., Inc.,407 F. Supp. 154,
161 (E.D. Texas 1976).
157. 436 U.S. at 321.
158. Id. at 321-22.
159. Id. at 321.
160. Id. at 313.
161. Id. at 321.
162. Conflicts in the case law leave unsettled the question whether a search mayconstitutionally
be measured against a reasonableness standard alone or whether a warrant is mandatory. Determining
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determining the exceptions to the Camara-See rule after Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE Camara-See
RULE AFTER Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable to particular
administrative inspections the Supreme Court has balanced the
governmental interest against the fourth amendment interest of the
individual or entity subject to the challenged inspection. 63 This balancing
process is evident in the line of administrative inspection cases from
Camara and See to Barlow's.16 4 Two principles govern this balancing of
the government's need to inspect against the intrusion into privacy that
whether a warrantless search is unreasonable per se or merely presumptively unreasonable requires a
balancing of the fourth amendments prohibition of unreasonable searches and its requirements for the
issuance of a warrant. Conflicting conclusions result from different views of the dependency between
the fourth amendment's two clauses. Carden, Federal Power to Seize and Search Without Warrant, 18
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1964), finds the clauses completely dependent so that the second clause, which
establishes the standards for issuing warrants, provides the exclusive method for initiating a reasonable
search. See also Comment, Cause to Search and Seize, 26 LA. L. REv. 802 (1966); Note, supra notc59,
at 611-12 & n.14. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1921), asserts
that because the amendment was drafted in two parts, the phrase "unreasonable searches" must cover
more than the form of the warrant.
Among the cases concerning administrative inspections, Canara asserted a strict dependency
view of the fourth amendment's clauses, stating that except in very narrowly defined classes ofeases, a
search of private property without consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant. 387 U.S. at 528-29. See held that warrantless searches of homes are presumptively
unreasonable. 387 U.S. at 542. Yet in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the Court held that a
warrantless visit to a welfare recipient's dwelling was reasonable. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) the Supreme Court held that all searches must be reasonable and those without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable, yet in Terry v. Ohio, the Court deemed the two clauses
independent and posited different requirements for a reasonable search as compared to it search based
strictly on probable cause. 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The Court has asserted the "[t]he ultimate standard set
forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973);
accord, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ("The relevant test is not whether It is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.")
163. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976), In Camara and See the Court's
balancing process is reflected in the adoption of aflexible probable cause standard for obtaining the
administrative search warrant. See notes 31-35 & 39-40 and accompanying text supra; see also
Greenberg, supra note 30, at 1012.
164. Prior to Camara and See the Court used a balancing approach only in cases calling for
immediate action. These exceptional situations required balancing governmental necessity against
citizens' privacy and resulted in the abandonment of the fourth amendiment's warrant requirements.
Greenberg, supra note 30, at 1012. In Camara the Court held that the individual's right to privacy mnust
be balanced against the reasonable and valid purpose of inspections to ensure public health and safety.
387 U.S. at 535. According to Camara, issuance of a warrant is based on satisfaction of a flexible
probable cause standard. The need to search is weighed against the invasion the search entails; the
resulting balance may vary from inspection to inspection, depending upon the public need for effective
enforcement in a particular area, the nature of the search proposed, the legislative and administrative
standards under which particular regulatory inspections are to be conducted, an agency's experience
with particular facilities, and the length of time that has passed without inspection. Id. at 535-39,
A balancing approach was also taken in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. See 436 U.S. 307, 315-18
(1978). In Barlow's the government suggested that the Court decide whether a warrant is needed by
arriving at a sensible balance between the administrative necessities of warrantless OSHA inspections
and the protection of privacy a warrant would afford. Id. at 315-16. Its position was that a decision
exempting OSHA from the warrant requirement would give full recognition to the competing public
and private interests at stake. Id. at 316. These arguments were rejected by the court. See notes 160-62
and accompanying text supra.
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inspection entails: (1) warrantless searches are the exception and not the
rule; and (2) the exceptions that operate to negate the warrant
requirement for nonconsensual searches apply only in certain carefully
defined classes of cases. 165 By using these two governing principles as a
starting point for balancing the competing interests at stake, four general
classes of exceptions to the Camara-See rule can be defined: (1) emergency
inspections; (2) consensual inspections; (3) inspections of objects in plain
view; and (4) the Colonnade-Biswell exception for pervasively regulated
industries.
A. Emergency Inspections
In Camara the Supreme Court specifically recognized the exception
to the warrant requirement for emergency situations: "[N]othing we say
today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant,
that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations." 166 Under a
balancing analysis, "exigent circumstances eliminate the warrant require-
ment because the urgency of an immediate search outweighs the right to
privacy."' 67 This exception is applicable only in extreme situations such as
seizures of unwholesome food, compulsory smallpox vaccinations, health
quarantines, and summary destruction of tubercular cattle.'16
The continuing vitality of the emergency exception is evident from the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Michigan v. Tyler.'69 There the Court
said that "[a] burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient
proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable.' ,170 Once the
firefighters are in the building to put out a fire, and for a reasonable time
thereafter, they may investigate the causes of the fire and seize evidence of
arson that is in plain view.' 7 ' Subsequent entries to inspect the cause of the
blaze must be made pursuant to warrant procedures governing
administrative searches. 172 If the investigators find probable cause to be-
lieve that arson has occurred and further access is required to obtain
evidence for possible prosecution, then the traditional showing of
probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of a crime must be met
to obtain the warrant. 173
165. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
166. Id. at 539.
167. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 351.
168. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). See North American Cold Storage
Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of
Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 61Q, 165 N.E. 498
(1929) (destruction of cattle).
169. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
170. Id. at 509.
171. Id. Fora discussion of the "plain view" exception, see notes 187-97 and accompan)ing text
infra.
172. 436 U.S. at 511.
173. Id. at 511-12.
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The Court's balancing approach to the fourth amendment issues
relating to administrative inspections is shown by this exception to the
warrant requirement. The privacy interest and the attendant warrant
requirement must give way to administrative necessity when compelled by
exigent circumstances.1
74
B. Consensual Inspections
175
Valid consent operates as a waiver of the fourth amendment right
against warrantless searches. 76 Most administrative inspections are
conducted on the basis of consent because it is questionable whether a firm
should withhold consent unless there is some genuine doubt about the
validity of the inspection. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the Supreme Court
recognized that "the great majority of businessmen can be expected in
normal course to consent to inspection without warrant.'
The standard of consent for administrative inspections is less
stringent than that required for criminal searches.178 In United States v.
Thriftimart, Inc., 17 9 the Ninth Circuit held that consent to an ad-
ministrative inspection does not have to be express and that failure to
object to a known search constitutes consent.180 By contrast, the inherently
coercive police presence and the element of surprise that attend criminal
searches strongly suggest that consent in the criminal context should be
express and voluntary.' 8' In the administrative context, consent "is not
only not suspect but is to be expected . . . ,[I]nspection itself is
inevitable. Nothing is to be gained by demanding a warrant except that the
inspectors have been put to trouble-an unlikely aim for the businessman
anxious for administrative good will.' 82 After all, the probable cause
standard for obtaining an administrative search warrant is more flexible
174. See Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 353.
175. See generally id. at 353-58.
176. Id. at 353.
177. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978). The exception was also delineated In
See v. City of Seattle: "We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent . . . may
only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant
procedure." 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (emphasis added).
178. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 354-55.
179. 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926, rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 1002
(1971).
180. In Thriftimart, Food and Drug Administration inspectors presented notices of inspection
to warehouse managers and requested permission to enter and inspect. The managers said "go ahead"
even though the inspectors did not have search warrants. The inspectors did not advise the managers
that they had a right to insist on search warrants, 429 F.2d at 1008; nevertheless, the consent was held
valid. See also United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1002 (1970) (consent found although it was not actually expressed and despite unawareness of the
right to refuse consent).
181. See Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 354 & n.79 (citipg Schenckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
182. 429 F.2d at 1009.
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than the showing required for a criminal search warrant.183 Demanding
a warrant usually will not prevent an inspection, only delay it.
In Thriftimart the court also held that the failure of the inspector to
warn a company's managers of their right to insist on a warrant did not
render consent unknowing or involuntary.18 4 If asked, however, inspectors
must indicate that there is a right to refuse a warrantless inspection,185 and
when there is any evidence of intimidation, coercion, or misrepresentation,
the alleged consent will be invalid.
186
C. Plain View, Public View, and Open Fields
The third exception to the Camnara-See rule applies when the object of
the inspection is open to public view. 8 7 This exception was expressly
referred to in See: "[A]dministrative entry, without consent, upon the
portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may
only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the
framework of a warrant procedure."' 88 It follows that a warrant is not
required for an administrative inspection of premises that are open to the
public. 8 9 This is consistent with the traditional view that merely observing
what is open to public view does not constitute a search. 90
This exception was expressly applied to administrative inspections by
the Supreme Court in Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa
Corp.'91 A state inspector entered a company's outdoor premises without
its knowledge or consent in order to conduct a test of the plumes of smoke
coming out of the company's chimneys. 9 2 The inspector did not have a
warrant and state law at that time did not require one.19 The company
argued that this inspection was unreasonable under Camara and See and
183. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978):
Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an
administrative search such as this, probable causejustifying the issuance ofa warrant may be
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . .inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Caniara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
at 538.
184. 429 F.2d at 1010. See also United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973) (not
necessary for Internal Revenue Service agents to tell a taxpayer that he could demand a warrant for
their search of his private tax records).
185. United States v. Anile, 352 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. W.Va. 1973) (inspection of drugstore by
agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs).
186. United States v. J. B. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969).
187. See generally Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 366-70.
188. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
189. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 7, at 366.
190. Id. at 366-67 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
191. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
192. Id. at 862-63. The test was authorized by Colorado law, which required a trained inspector
to stand where he had an unobstructed view of the smoke, observe it, and rate it according to a
pollution chart. 416 U.S. at 863 & n.l.
193. Id. at 863.
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violated the fourth amendment. 94 The Supreme Court held those cases
inapplicable because the field inspector did not enter the plant or its offices,
but merely observed what everyone in the area near the plant could see-
plumes of smoke. t95 Accordingly, the Court was unwilling to extend the
fourth amendment to sights seen in the open fields.1
96
If privacy is invaded by inspections of objects in plain view or open
fields, the incursion is abstract and theoretical. 197 When such a privacy
interest is weighed against the government's need to inspect, the balance
tips sharply toward the government since the invasion of privacy is almost
nonexistent.
D. The Colonnade-Biswell Exception
Governmental inspections of pervasively regulated industries may not
require warrants because the regulatory policies at work will outweigh the
limited expectations of privacy of the owner of the business. In order for
warrantless inspections of this nature to pass constitutional muster, certain
criteria must be satisfied. Before Barlow's, a three-judge federal district
court summarized the criteria as follows:
First, the enterprise sought to be inspected must be engaged in a pervasively
regulated business . . . . Second, warrantless inspection must be a crucial
part of a regulatory scheme designed to further an urgent federal interest.
And third, the inspection must be conducted in accord with a statutorily
authorized procedure, itself carefully limited by statute as to time, place, and
scope.1 98
194. Id. at 864.
195. Id. at 864-65. The Court emphasized that the inspector did not enter any part of the plant
and that even though he was on the company's property, he was not advised that the public was
excluded from that area.
196. Id. at 865. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
197. 416 U.S. at 865.
198. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 631-32 (D. N.M. 1976) (three-judge
court). Satisfaction of the first criterion ensures that warrantless inspection will pose only a minimal
threat to justifiable expectations of privacy; the third criterion guards against the possibility that any
inspection right will be abused. Id. The second criterion limits the type of governmental interest that
justifies suspension of that warrant requirement. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,413 U.S. 266,
270-71 (1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-17 (1972). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's use of these criteria in Biswell, see notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
Since Biswell the Supreme Court has not provided guidance concerning the definition and
relationship of these criteria, but it seems clear that the criteria are dependent and that all must be
present for the exception to apply. See, e.g., Usery v. Centrif-Air Mach, Co., 424 F. Supp. 959, 961
(N.D. Ga. 1977); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D. N.M. 1976); Brennan v.
Gibson's Prods., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 161 (E.D. Tex. 1976). Other courts have described the
exception as having four elements that must be satisfied: (1) whether there is pervasive federal
regulation to further a valid governmental interest; (2) whether the owners or occupants of the premises
have a reasonable expectation of privacy; (3) whether a warrant requirement would frustrate the
purpose of the inspection; and (4) whether the statute is sufficiently limited to curtail the discretion of
the inspector. See generally Usery v. Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959, 961 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Weissberg, supra note 24, at 932. The elements overlap; whether the interpretation lists three or fouris
not significant. In order for a statutorily authorized inspection scheme to be valid, a court must be able
to conclude that the inspection furthers an urgent federal interest and that the possibilities of abuse and
the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316
(1972).
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These 6riteria seem to have been left intact in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.199
Each will be examined in order to determine the scope of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception under the balancing approach suggested in recent
Supreme Court cases dealing with administrative searches.
1. Ascertaining Pervasive Regulation
Pervasive regulation is the most important of the three criteria. This
requirement is defined restrictively; the inspection scheme must be directed
at a pervasively regulated aspect of a specific industry in order to be
reasonable. If it is determined that the inspection scheme is not part of the
pervasive regulation of a specific industry, administrative inspection
without a warrant contravenes justifiable expectations of privacy and
violates the fourth amendment.2°° One who elects to engage in a
pervasively regulated business is necessarily aware that the applicable
regulations may include effective inspection.201 The intrusiveness of
inspection is thereby diminished because the expectation of privacy in a
pervasively regulated industry is presumed to be less than in a
nonregulated business. The heavily regulated business accepts the
"burdens as well as the benefits" of the trade and in effect consents to the
restrictions placed upon it.202 In this context, warrantless inspections do
not pose a significant threat to privacy.
To satisfy the pervasive regulation criterion, the warrantless
inspection procedure must be part of a detailed regulatory statute aimed at
a particular aspect of a specific industry.20 3 By contrast, warrantless
statutory inspection procedures aimed at a particular aspect of doing
business common to many industries will not be upheld even if the statute
authorizing the inspection is specific and even if there is an urgent federal
interest at stake. A less rigid view of regulation, which might weigh the
cumulative effect of federal regulations dealing with trade practices, the
environment, civil rights, and labor relations in its determination of
pervasiveness, would subject the entirety of American businesses engaged
in interstate commerce to warrantless inspection schedules aimed at any
199. See notes 157-62 and accompanying text supra.
200. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D. N.M. 1976). See Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1978).
201. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972).
202. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973). See also Youghiogheny and
Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
203. The dissent in Barlow's, written by Justice Stevens, reads the majority's opinion this way.
See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 336 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
maintained that the pertinent inquiry is not whether the inspection program is authorized by a
regulatory statute directed at a single industry, but whether Congress has limited the exercise of the
inspection power to those commercial premises where the evils at which thestatute is directed are to be
found. Id. at 337. Contrary to Stevens' view the majority found that OSHA was notso limited and their
opinion indicated that both inquiries are pertinent. Id. at 320. For example, an inspection program
aimed at a particular industry but directed at an "evil" not likely to be found in that industry would be
unreasonable.
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number of congressionally perceived urgent federal interests. Under such a
multistatute view of pervasive regulation, all businesses (and arguably
every individual) would be pervasively regulated.0 4
Conditions that determine whether a particular industry is pervasive-
ly regulated include the regulatory statute in question, the nature of the
industry, the presence of a license, the history of governmental supervision
of the industry, and the object of the particular regulatory scheme.
Longevity and licensing are relevant, but their presence should not
decisively determine the existence of pervasive regulation.
In Biswell, for example, the Supreme Court found that the Gun
Control Act of 1968 provided for pervasive regulation of firearms in the
detailed requirements that the Act placed on licensed firearms dealers.03
The regulations were "industry specific," and therefore it was certain that
the object of the inspection-firearms-would be found on the premises.
In Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal,20 6 which upheld warrantless inspections
under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, the existence
of several federal statutes governing the coal industry constituted
pervasive regulation, even though that issue was riot litigated.0 7 Those
statutes were also industry specific, and since coal mines were reasonably
presumed to be dangerous, it was quite likely that the object of the
inspection-dangerous working conditions-would be found at the
premises. The pervasive regulation of business in each of these cases
limited the privacy expectations of the owners, who in effect were held to
have consented to the regulation.
Whether a business is licensed is relevant to the issue of pervasive
regulation but not decisive. In Del Campo Baking208 the district court
found no valid distinction between a licensed business and one that is
unlicensed but heavily regulated.20 9 The court upheld a warrantless
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act inspection of the baking company
because the defendant's "business of manufacturing, processing, packing,
and distributing food . .. [was] as 'pervasively regulated' by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, as if it were federally licensed., ,2 '0 This conclusion is
reasonable because the presence of pervasive regulation in the industry-
specific sense, like the requirements for obtaining and maintaining a
204. Accord, Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications, supra note 70, at 785-86, Contra,
Weissberg, supra note 25, at 435-36 (arguing that it is possible for one statute to be part of an overall
picture of multistatute pervasive regulation).
205. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312 n.l (1972).
206. Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973). See notes
94-101 and accompanying text supra.
207. 364 F. Supp. at 49-50 & n.3.
208. United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972). See notes
90-93 and accompanying text supra.
209. Id. at 1377.
210. Id.
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license to operate, ensures that a warrantless inspection will pose only a
minimal threat to justifiable expectations of privacy.2 1
The longevity of a regulatory program for an industry can also reduce
a business' reasonable expectation of privacy and is therefore relevant in
determining whether pervasive regulation exists.21 2 In Colonnade the long
history of regulation of the liquor business included special treatment of
inspection laws; this history provided a basis for the Court to uphold
Congress' authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for ad-
ministrative searches in the liquor industry.213 Nevertheless, Biswell makes
it clear that the absence of a history of regulation is not dispositive of the
power to search without a warrant. In Biswell, the urgency of the industry-
specific federal interest in regulating the traffic in firearms was sufficient to
sustain the validity of the search procedures in the then-recently enacted
Gun Control Act.214
In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,1 5 on the other hand, the
Internal Revenue Code provision authorizing the warrantless search of the
petitioner's premises covered all defaults on all taxes. The government's
justification for the search was that the petitioner's assets were seizable to
satisfy tax assessments against an individual.2 6 The intrusion was not
based on the nature of petitioner's business, its license, or any regulation of
its activities (other than the fact it had to file returns and pay taxes). Thus,
the Court was unwilling to hold that the "mere interest in the collection of
taxes" was sufficient to exempt this kind of search from the warrant
217
requirement. The collection of taxes could not amount to "pervasive
regulation" within the meaning of Bisivell because the effect of income
taxation is so generalized that it does not diminish a taxpayer's
expectations of privacy with regard to his records and property.2t '
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 219 presented a more difficult situation in
211. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 631-32 (D. N.M. 1976).
212. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.436 U.S. 307,313 (1978). Justice Stevens, however, argued in
his dissenting opinion in Barlow's that the longevity of a regulatory program does not have any bearing
on the reasonableness of routine inspections and is not a controlling factor in determining whether a
warrantless inspection scheme fits within the Colonnade-Biswell exception. Id. at 336. The critical
factor for Justice Stevens is "the Congressional determination that federal regulation would further
significant public interests, not the date that determination was made." Id. at 337. Congress' conception
of what constitutes an urgent federal interest is not static. Id. at 336-37. The fact that a particular
industry was not subject to any federal supervision for many years should not prevent Congress from
determining that a need for much closer scrutiny now exists, and perhaps deciding that warrantless
inspections are a crucial part of this new regulatory scheme. Id. at 337.
213. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
214. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
215. 429 U.S. 338 (1977). See notes 118-24 and accompanying text supra.
216. Id. at 354.
217. Id. at 354, 358.
218. The fact that the Internal Revenue Code is a highly specific statute with great detail and
complexity did not bring this search within the Colonnade-Bisvell exception. Contra, Note, OSHA
Inspections and the Fourth Amendment: Balancing Private Rights and Public Need,4 FORDI^wt URa.
L.J. 101, 116 (1977). Everyone does not, by reason of status as a taxpayer, effectively consent to
warrantless IRS searches and the Internal Revenue Code is not industry specific.
219. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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which to determine the presence of pervasive regulation. It was clear to the
Court that previous federal regulation of working conditions had never
been as comprehensive as under OSHA and that the mere imposition of
minimum wages and maximum hours on employers under federal laws
relating to government contracts did not prepare "the entirety of American
interstate commerce for regulation of working conditions to the minutest
detail., 220 Nor did the various federal laws dealing with the general welfare
of the American worker amount to pervasive regulation within the
meaning of Colonnade or Biswell, even though it was argued that such
laws had long affected the entirety of businesses engaged in interstate
commerce, had pervasively regulated the safety of the work place and the
health of the worker prior to the establishment of OSHA, and had
prepared American business for OSHA's specific regulation of employee
working circumstances. 2
The Court's holding in Barlow's, therefore, was consistent with G.M.
Leasing, which indicated that the Colonnade-Biswell exception would not
extend to an inspection procedure aimed at a general aspect of doing
business common to virtually all industries. 222 Moreover, one had not
consented to OSHA's warrantless inspections simply by having
employees. In contrast, Colonnade and Biswell referred to closely
regulated "business[es]" or "industries," certain "industries" having a
history of government oversight, or a single "industry" in which regulation
might already be pervasive.2 3
From the foregoing it can be inferred that a warrantless inspection
scheme will be upheld only if it is narrow in scope and part of a statute
220. 436 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
221. The Department of Labor argued that OSHA
is not the first cong~essional regulation of employee safety and health in industry as a whole
rather than in particular types of businesses. It is but the most recent expression of
congressional concern that began with the Walsh-Healy Act. . . Thus, at least two
generations of employers have been subjected to extensive federal regulation of employee
safety and health. The limited intrusion here into appellee's privacy was therefore based upon
longstanding regulation in the limited sphere of employee safety and health and not simply
upon appellee's generalized status as a business establishment.
Brief for Appellant, Department of Labor at 43-44, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)
(footnotes omitted). Furthermore, it was asserted that Congress is fully empowered to authorize
limited warrantless inspections so long as they do not impede legitimat2. expectations of privacy and
when a magistrate's evaluation would not afford meaningful protection. The Department of Labor
urged that it is difficult to believe that Congress and the states during the last 70 years would have
enacted such a large number of regulatory statutes providing for warrantless inspections if the rule were
understood to be otherwise, or even subject to substantial uncertainty. Id. at 48-50. An amicus brief
filed by eleven states in support of OHSA's inspection provisions similarly urged that workplace safety
and health has long been subject to pervasive regulation. Brief for Eleven States as Amicus Curiae at 8
n.12, Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
222. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352-59 (1977).
223. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp, v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72, 74, 77 (1970). OSHA, however, is not industry specific;'its provisions apply to all
employee-staffed businesses affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 65 i(b)(3)(1976). "The Court,
however, concludes that the deference accorded Congress in Biswell and Colonnade should be limited
to situations where the evils addressed by the regulatory statute are peculiar to a specific industry and
that industry is one which has been long subject to Government regulation." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inm,
436 U.S. 307, 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Vol. 40:81
ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS
addressed to a particular aspect of a specific industry that is the object of
intense governmental concern. 224 The governing statute must be industry-
specific; 225 the history of regulation or the presence of a licensing
requirement in the industry may be relevant to the inquiry. The scope of
the OSHA inspection was circumscribed by statute, but the regulatory
scheme did not have the necessary narrow focus 227 that would have
ensured that expectations of privacy were not threatened and that the
inspection would advance the urgent federal interests upon which the
regulatory scheme was premised.228
2. Urgent Federal Interests
In order to fit within the Colonnade-Biswell exception, a "warrantless
inspection must be a crucial part of a regulatory scheme designed to further
an urgent federal interest. ' 229 Warrantless inspections may be considered
vital to a regulatory scheme only if requiring a warrant would
frustrate the purpose of the inspection.
In determining the urgency of the federal interest and thejustification
for warrantless inspection, the Biswell Court examined the purposes of the
regulatory scheme, congressional findings, legislative history, and the
nature of the particular business operations to be inspected. The Court
concluded that the regulation of interstate traffic in firearms furthered an
urgent federal interest because
close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal
efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the
firearms traffic within their borders . . . .Large interests are at stake and
inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme, since it assures that
weapons are distributed through regular channels and in a traceable manner
and makes possible the prevention of sales to undesirable customers and the
detection of the origin of particular firearms.2 30
The Court also relied upon detailed congressional findings and Con-
224. See Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 633 (D. N.M. 1976).
225. A regulatory statute that is pervasive in the industry-specific sense essentially serves the
same function as a valid administrative search warrant because there in effect is probable cause to
believe that the object ofthe inspection will be found on the premises searched. See Note, supra notc71,
at 890.
226. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) (1976) and 29 C.F.R. §§ 1903.1 & 1903.7(1977) limited the inspection
to areas, materials, and machines with which employees have contact, and to records directly relevant
to the purpose of the inspection: detecting safety and health hazards.
227. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 633 (D. N.M. 1976).
OSHA's sweep is broad, and Congress' findings supporting it are slender. Made subject
to its warrantless inspection is every private concern engaged in a business affecting
commerce which has employees and all "environments" where these employees work. It thus
embraces . . . the whole spectrum of unrelated and disparate activities which compose
private enterprise in the United States.
Brennan v. Gibson's Prod., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 161 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
228. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1973). Contra, Weissberg,
supra note 25, at 438.
229. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 632 (D. N.M. 1976).
230. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972).
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gress' declaration of the purposes of the Gun Control Act of 1968.23'
After determining that the Act's regulatory scheme furthered urgent
federal interests and that inspection was a crucial part of the scheme, the
Court reasoned that warrantless inspections were necessary and
reasonable because
if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced,
even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a
warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to
time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a
warrant would be negligible.232
See was distinguished because there the warrant requirement was not a
threat to the effectiveness of the inspection system. In See the objects of the
inspection-building code violations-were difficult to conceal or correct
in a short time. On the other hand illegal firearms were not difficult to
conceal in a short time, and requiring a warrant could frustrate achieving
the goals of inspection.233
In Youghiogheny234 detailed congressional findings and declarations
pursuant to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 provided
a showing that urgent federal interests were at stake in the regulation of the
mines.235 The court deferred to this judgment of Congress in upholding
warrantless inspections as a crucial part of this regulatory scheme.
The health, safety and the very lives of coal miners are jeopardized when
mandatory health and safety laws are violated. Congress had reason to
believe that past regulatory experience compelled a more comprehensive
statutory scheme which depends, for its successful implementation, upon
frequent, unannounced inspections. Granting the assumptions of this
approach, Congress may have had cause to conclude that resort to a judicial
officer, prior to every inspection, could tend to frustrate its legislative
purpose.
36
The Barlow's decision, however, held OSHA's warrantless inspection
power unconstitutional even though Congress apparently had determined
231. Id. at 315. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 Historical Note (1976).
232. 406 U.S. at 316.
233. Id. at 316-17.
234. Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.Ohio 1973). See notes
94-101 and accompanying text supra.
235. 364 F. Supp. at 47, 50. The Act specifically authorized frequent inspections, without
advance notice, at least four times a year to implement its mandatory health and safety standards. See
30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976).
236. 364 F. Supp. at 50. Courts have shown similar deference to congressional determinations of
urgent federal interest in cases concerning warrantless Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
inspections. They have acknowledged that the importance of such regulations to the public health puts
FDA inspections "within the same category of highly scrutinized endeavors which justifiably includes
both the liquor and firearms industries." United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.D.C.
1973). See also United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp, 141, 143 (N.D. Okla, 1973). The
imposition of a warrant requirement would tend to frustrate the purpoe of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act because the effectiveness of FDA inspections depends on their being frequent and
unannounced.
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that such a power was crucial to achieving the urgent governmental
interest that underlay the Act-assuring safe working conditions for every
worker.237 The rejection of the Act's inspection scheme was not, however,
based on a determination that there was not an urgent federal interest at
stake. Rather, the Court concluded that requiring warrants would not
prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute or make inspections
less effective.238 Achievement of the statute's goals would not be frustrated
by requiring a warrant. 9
The Supreme Court was willing to second guess Congress because of
the general rule against warrantless inspections and because of its
conclusion that the administrative necessities of OSHA did not outweigh
the privacy interests at stake.2 40 The health and safety conditions upon
which OSHA focuses are unlikely to disappear during the time it takes to
obtain a warrant.2 4' Unlike contraband guns or liquor, the objects of an
OSHA inspection-unsafe machinery, environmental hazards, and the
like-are not easily concealed or removed from premises during the time
required to obtain a warrant,242 nor are they always as inherently
dangerous as coal mines, drugs or adulterated food.243 Having to obtain an
inspection warrant does not frustrate the effectuation of the Act's
purposes.
3. Statutory Limitations on the Search
In Camara the Supreme Court expressed concern about possible
abuses of the power to conduct warrantless searches. It noted the function
a magistrate plays in delimiting the scope of a search:
Under the present system [of unannounced warrantless entries by
housing code inspectors], when the inspector demands entry, the occupant
237. In support of the urgency of this interest it has been pointed out that one out of every four
American workers is exposed on the job to some substance capable of causing death or disease. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1977, at I, col. 2. One hundred thousand workers die each yearfromjob related injuries
and diseases. Id. Dec. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 4. The Department of Health. Education, and Welfare
estimates that some 390,000 new cases of occupational diseases occur each year. and as many as
100,000 deaths. N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 3-4 (1976). OSHA was Congress' response to
the problems of workplace safety and health. Its stated purpose was "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the nation safeand healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 651(1976).
In considering the Act, Congress faced these facts and found that "this grim current
scene . . . represents a worsening trend." S. REP. No. 91-1282,91st Cong.,2d Sess.2(1970). See
also Brief for Eleven States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
238. 436 U.S. at 312-21. The Court pointed out that most businessmen will consent to a
search without a warrant, that the Act contemplates surprise searches, and that procedures are avail-
able to obtain exparte warrants after a refusal. Id. at 316-17.
239. Contra, Weissberg, supra note 25, at 439-41.
240. Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed with the majority's regard for congressionaljudgment.
"While one may question the wisdom of pervasive governmental oversight of industrial life, I decline to
question Congress'judgment that the inspection power is a necessary enforcement device in achieving
the goals of a valid exercise of regulatory power." 436 U.S. at 339 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
241. This is disputed. Some have argued that OSHA violations can easily be concealed or
temporarily corrected while the inspector procures a warrant. See Weissbergsupra note25. at 439-42.
242. Note, supra note 84, at 110.
243. See id. at 99 n.47.
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has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved
requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector
himself is acting under proper authorization.244
This concern about abuse explains the third criterion that must be satisfied
before a warrantless inspection scheme fits within the Colonnade-Biswell
exception. The inspectioh must be conducted in accordance with a
statutorily authorized procedure that carefully limits time, place, and
scope in order to guard against possible abuse of an inspection right.
245
The most important consideration is the language of the statute, as
noted in Biswell: "In the context of a regulatory inspection system of
business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the
legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid
statute., 246 The warrantless inspections authorized by the Gun Control
Act of 1968 and upheld in Biswell were statutorily limited to the dealer's
business hours, his premises (including places of storage), and to required
records or documents and firearms or ammunition kept or stored there.
2 47
In addition to these limitations, the Court pointed out that each licensed
dealer is given a compilation of ordinances describing his obligations and
the inspector's authority24 so that "[t]he dealer is not left to wonder about
the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.
2 49
Similarly, in Youghiogheny the district court considered the purposes
of the inspection provisions of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969250 and concluded that there was only a slight danger of any
abuse of power flowing from the Act's authorization of warrantless
entry.25' The Act did not expressly limit the time of inspections, but made it
very clear that frequent (at least four times a year) unannounced
inspections were necessary to implement its mandatory health and safety
standards.252 Even though the scope of these frequent inspections included
every aspect of mine health and safety conditions, the court felt that there
was no real danger that the inspector would exceed his authority.2" This
broad investigative scope was necessary because health and safety
conditions are "coterminous with the operation of the mine" by reason of
244. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
245. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F. Supp. 627, 632 (D. N.M. 1976).
246. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,315 (1972). Language in Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States also suggests that " w]here Congress has authorized inspection but made no rules
governing the procedure that inspectors must follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrietive
rules apply." 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976).
248. 406 U.S. at 316 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(19) (1976)).
249. Id. at 316.
250. 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976).
251. Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp, 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
252. Id. at 47-48 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 813(a), 813(b)(1)(1976)).
253. 364 F. Supp. at 51.
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the fact that no other operations are carried out at a site. The court also
noted that mine owners must know and comply with the Act's standards,
that they are aware of the limits on the inspector's powers, and that they
know inspectors act under lawful authority.
254
The language of a provision authorizing warralitless inspections must
be reasonably precise in its limitations. Section 923(g) of the Gun Control
Act of 1968, upheld in Biswell, sets a reasonable standard of precision. 55
The Del Campo decision upheld less precise language that authorized
inspection "at reasonable times," within "reasonable limits," of
warehouses containing food products subject to regulation under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2 6 This language is more precise
than the ordinance struck down in See,257 which was an expansive grant of
authority that allowed an inspector to roam at will throughout the
premises without the "owner being able to determine the need for the
inspection, its purpose and its lawful limits., 25 8 At a minimum, a statutory
inspection provision by its terms must be limited with sufficient precision
so that it serves the purposes of a warrant and prevents a general search. 2 9
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not announced any far reaching exceptions to
the warrant requirement since its decisions in Camara and See. In Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc. it emphatically reaffirmed its earlier holdings in Camara
and See that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
254. Id.
255. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976) provides in part:
Each ... licensed dealer ... shall maintain such records of importation, production,
shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition, of firearms and ammunition at such place, for
such period, and in such form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe.
Such . . . dealers . . . shall make such records available for inspection at all reasonable
times, and shall submit to the Secretary such reports and information with respect to such
records and the contents thereof as he shall by regulations prescribe. The Secretary may enter
during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or
ammunition . . . dealer, . . . for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records
or documents required to be kept by such . . . dealer, . . . under the provisions of this
chapter or regulations issued under this chapter, and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or
stored by such . . . dealer . . . at such premises.
256. United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972). The
inspection provision held to be constitutional is 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1976).
257. Se v. City ofSeattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). At issue was the followinginspection provision in
the Seattle Fire Code:
Inspection of Buildings und Premises. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he
may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be
necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to
cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance
concerning fire hazards.
Seattle, Wash., Fire Code § 8.01.050. See also Note, supra note 71, at 889.
258. United States exreL Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682,684-85 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1969)).
259. The statutory provision authorizing warrantless searches should be limited with adequate
precision with respect to time, place, and scope so that a warrant, if issued, would simply track the
statute and give the person objecting to the search nothing more than he already had. See id.
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private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant., 260 Four distinct classes of
cases are the recognized exceptions to the rule of Canara-See: emergency
inspections, plain view, consensual inspections, and the Colonnade-
Biswell exception for pervasively regulated industries. The decision also
serves to clarify the definition and scope of the Colonnade-Biswell
exception by limiting the exception to circumstances in which the
challenged statutory inspection procedure is a crucial part of a detailed
regulatory scheme aimed at a pervasively regulated aspect of a specific
industry. The regulatory scheme must further an urgent federal interest,
and the inspection procedure must be carefully limited with respect to
time, place, and scope.
Satisfaction of the foregoing criteria indicates that expectations of
privacy are limited and that the regulatory statute itself functions as a valid
administrative search warrant. Under those circumstances, warrantless
,administrative inspections do not interfere with fourth amendment rights.
260. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
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